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Applying the Definition of Torture to 
the Acts of Non-State Actors: The Case 
of Trafficking in Human Beings 
Lorna McGregor* 
ABSTRACT
The question of whether the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment 
extends to the acts of non-state actors continues to reflect a contentious 
issue in international human rights law. Through one of the most recent and 
under-analyzed manifestations of the debate, this article explores the extent 
to which the prohibition applies to trafficking in human beings. In doing 
so, it provides an analysis of the inherent limitations of the prohibition as 
applied to the acts of non-state actors, as well as suggesting possibilities 
for extension of the scope of the prohibition through the principle of due 
diligence. By defining the parameters in this way, this article submits that 
victims will receive more concrete protection, as opposed to assertions 
that trafficking constitutes torture on the basis of the severity of the act and 
attraction to the special stigma of the label alone.
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I. INTRoDUCTIoN
The UN Convention on the Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Ill-Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture) is 
one of the few international instruments to provide a definition of torture. 
It defines torture in Article 1 as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is in-
tentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.1
Since its adoption, the Convention has engendered substantial criticism 
for its perceived focus on the actions of public officials or persons acting 
in an official capacity, to the exclusion of the commission of similar acts 
by non-state actors, such as armed groups, corporations, and other private 
individuals.2 Feminist scholarship has been particularly rich3 in this critique 
through layered arguments that the definition focuses on male violence 
and privileges violence in the public sphere,4 with the consequence that 
violence against women committed in private, such as domestic violence, 
is excluded5 and “trivialized.”6 The prohibition of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment (“other ill-treatment”) has 
therefore been subject to many efforts to expand its application to the acts 
of non-state actors.
One of the latest manifestations of such efforts relates to trafficking in 
human beings (trafficking). Both the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
 1. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art. 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
 2. See, e.g., Robert McCorquodale & Rebecca La Forgia, Taking off the Blindfolds: Torture 
by Non-State Actors, 1 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189, 217–18 (2001); AndRew CLApHAm, HumAn 
RigHts ObLigAtiOns Of nOn-stAte ACtORs 342–46 (2006). 
 3. The literature in this area is vast and diverse. See, e.g., HiLARy CHARLeswORtH & CHRistine 
CHinkin, tHe bOundARies Of inteRnAtiOnAL LAw: A feminist AnALysis 234–35 (2000); Alice Edwards, 
The “Feminizing” of Torture under International Human Rights Law, 19 Leiden J. int’L 
L. 349, 352–58 (2006); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: 
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 291, 296 (1994). 
 4. Edwards, supra note 3, at 352; Copelon, supra note 3, at 297.
 5. Edwards, supra note 3, at 355.
 6. Copelon, supra note 3, at 295.
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2000 (Palermo Protocol)7 and the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 define trafficking as: 
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, 
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability 
or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of 
a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery 
or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.8
As the Palermo Protocol and Council of Europe Convention are pre-
dominantly focused on criminal law, their definition of trafficking does not 
automatically translate into international human rights law. To date, most 
treatments of trafficking under international human rights law have centered 
on the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor.
In recent years, however, the UN Committee against Torture and Other 
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Committee 
against Torture) has begun to regularly dedicate at least one paragraph of its 
Concluding Observations to trafficking.9 While it first referenced trafficking 
in 1990,10 it was not until 2006 that it explicitly found that it fell under 
Article 16 dealing with other ill-treatment.11 In the majority of Concluding 
Observations since then that have addressed trafficking, the Committee has 
dealt with the practice under Article 16 alone or in conjunction with other 
articles, such as Articles 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, and 14.12 In 2009, in the Com-
mittee’s Concluding Observations on Yemen, it also found that Article 1 on 
 7. G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, Art. 3(a), A/RES/55/25 (15 Nov. 2000).
 8. Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, art. 4(a), 
opened for signature, 16 May 2005, (entered into force 1 Feb. 2008). 
 9. The 2005 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the first reports in which the 
Committee dedicates substantial attention to the practice of trafficking. Committee against 
Torture (CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BIH/CO/1 (15 Dec. 2005).
10. CAT, Report of the Committee against Torture, ¶ 257, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (21 June 1990) 
(Cameroon).
11. CAT, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Togo, ¶ 
140–55, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/TGO/CO/1 (28 July 2006).
12. To take 2011 as an example, see CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee 
against Torture: Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BIH/CO/1 (20 Jan. 
2011) (violating arts. 2, 4 16); CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against 
Torture: Mongolia, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/MNG/CO/1 (20 Jan. 2011) (violating arts. 
2, 12, 13, 16); CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Ghana, 
¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GHA/CO/1 (15 June 2011) (violating arts. 2, 12 16); CAT, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Kuwait, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/KWT/CO/2 (28 June 2011) (raising arts. 2, 4, 16); CAT, Concluding Observations 
of the Committee against Torture: Slovenia, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SVN/CO/3 (20 June 
2011) (raising arts. 2, 4,16).
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torture was engaged by trafficking in addition to Articles 2, 12, and 16.13 
While it has not yet found an independent violation of Article 1, it has since 
dealt with trafficking as a violation of Articles 1 and 16 combined on six 
occasions,14 although in other instances it continues to deal with trafficking 
under Article 16 only.
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Forms of 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Special Rapporteur 
on Torture) addressed trafficking of women for “sexual or labour servitude 
or other forms of exploitation” in a report dedicated to strengthening the 
protection of women from torture.15 The European Court of Human Rights 
(European Court) in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia also found that in cases in 
which a specific allegation of other ill-treatment is not made, “any inhuman 
or degrading treatment” suffered by the victim “was inherently linked to the 
alleged trafficking and exploitation” and thus appropriate to deal with under 
the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor alone.16 
While suggesting that trafficking could violate the prohibition of torture 
and other ill-treatment, none of these international bodies has advanced 
detailed reasoning to support this view. Characterizing trafficking as torture 
or other ill-treatment without further explanation gives rise to three issues 
in need of resolution. First, trafficking is typically carried out by non-state 
actors within states or across multiple jurisdictions, whereas international 
human rights law, including the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, 
is concerned with state responsibility. Thus, it is not immediately clear how 
the prohibition could apply. Second, trafficking is “a process that involves 
a number of interrelated actions rather than a single act at a given point in 
13. CAT, Provisional Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Yemen, ¶ 
30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/YEM/CO/2 (17 Dec. 2009). It previously referred to trafficking within 
a range of prohibited practices under Articles 1 and 16 in its Concluding Observations 
on Benin, CAT, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: 
Benin, ¶¶ 22, 24, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BEN/CO/2 (19 Feb. 2008), making it difficult to 
draw definitive conclusions on the categorization of trafficking. 
14. CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Jordan, ¶ 22, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/JOR/CO/2 (25 May 2010) (arts. 1, 2, 4, 12, 16); CAT, Concluding Observa-
tions of the Committee against Torture: Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
SYR/CO/1 (25 May 2010) (arts. 1, 2, 4, 12, 16); CAT, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee against Torture: Yemen, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/YEM/CO/2/Rev.1 (25 May 
2010) (arts. 1, 2, 12, 16); CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against 
Torture: Cambodia, ¶ 20, 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/KHM/CO/2 (20 Jan. 2011) (arts. 1, 2, 
4, 12, 16); CAT, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Ethiopia, 
¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/ETH/CO/1 (20 Jan. 2011) (arts. 1, 2, 12, 16); CAT, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee against Torture: Estonia, ¶ 13 U.N. Doc. CAT/C/EST/
CO/5 (17 June 2013) (arts. 1, 2, 4, 10, 12, 13, and 14).
15. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Manfred Nowak, ¶ 56–8, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/7/3 (15 Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Nowak Report].
16. Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 252 (7 Jan. 2010).
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time.”17 It is carried out for diverse purposes such as sexual services, domes-
tic, construction, and agricultural labor, forced begging, criminal activity,18 
and organ harvesting. Each case presents “complex external and individual 
circumstances”19 and the treatment of victims varies greatly between cases. 
The complex and composite nature of trafficking means that it is not im-
mediately obvious which aspect(s) would violate the prohibition of torture 
or other ill-treatment and whether all cases would fall under the definition. 
Third, as suggested by the European Court, justification for the applica-
tion of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment is necessary, if the 
prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor also applies. This is the 
case as the same facts may be used to find violations of both prohibitions. 
If the way in which the prohibition applies remains unclear or unex-
plored, labeling an act as torture or other ill-treatment carries very little legal 
significance and does not offer concrete protection to victims of trafficking. 
In addition, regardless of the appeal of referring to an act as torture due to 
its “special stigma”20 and recognized profile,21 expansion of the prohibition 
to cover acts not traditionally considered to fall within its purview, while 
possible, requires careful consideration in order to preserve the integrity 
of the prohibition and avoid its unprincipled dilution. This article provides 
a possible expansion of the prohibition, while acknowledging its inherent 
limitations.
Part II of this article argues that the potential contribution of the pro-
hibition of torture and other ill-treatment to dealing with trafficking under 
international human rights law is hampered by tendencies to focus on the 
nature of the underlying act without consideration to how international hu-
man rights law is concretely engaged. The treatment of trafficking as torture 
or other ill-treatment is inherently restricted as it is typically carried out by 
non-state actors and international human rights law is confined to determining 
state responsibility. The prohibition will therefore only be engaged in cases in 
which there is direct involvement of state officials, or more typically, where 
the authorities fail to prevent or protect victims of trafficking from torture or 
17. General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking, Especially in Women 
and Children, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. A/64/290 (12 Aug. 2009). 
18. Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 
on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims 
and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 2011 O.J. (L 101/1) ¶ 11.
19. Klara Skrivankova, Forced Labour: Understanding and Identifying Labour Exploitation, 
in HumAn tRAffiCking HAndbOOk: ReCOgnising tRAffiCking And mOdeRn-dAy sLAveRy in tHe uk 
27, 51 (Parosha Chandran ed., 2011) [hereinafter HAndbOOk]; See also Vanessa Munro, A 
Tale of Two Servitudes: Defining and Implementing a Domestic Response to Trafficking 
of Women for Prostitution in the UK and Australia, 14 sOC. & Leg. s. 91, 94 (2005).
20. As first recognized by the European Court of Human Rights in Case of Ireland v. The 
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59 (1978). 
21. Nowak Report, supra note 15, ¶ 26.
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other ill-treatment by non-state actors. In the latter situation, the state must 
be on notice (or constructive notice) of an allegation of ill-treatment. These 
requirements present serious challenges to the expansion of the prohibition 
of other ill-treatment to trafficking by non-state actors. The engagement of 
the prohibition of torture is even more difficult as the act of the state (in 
this case the failure to prevent or protect a victim) must have been carried 
out with a specific state purpose which rules out the vast majority of cases 
of trafficking. 
Rather than critiquing these limitations, I argue that by acknowledg-
ing and working within them, the application of the prohibition can move 
away from mere rhetoric, and instead focus on how states understand and 
implement their duty to identify potential victims and the strength of their 
prevention and protection systems. States’ due diligence obligations reflect 
an underdeveloped area of international human rights law which is often 
neglected in favor of a focus on the characterization of the underlying acts 
alone. However, the enforcement of these obligations is the site of greatest 
potential for the concrete protection of victims of trafficking under interna-
tional human rights law at least. Within these confines, in Part III, I argue 
that as a general matter, the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment 
provides a recognized framework of severity to the duty to prevent and pro-
tect victims of trafficking. If applied properly, the prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatment also challenges a narrow view that only some types of 
trafficking such as for the purpose of sexual exploitation reach the requisite 
level of severity by widening and individualizing the experience of traf-
ficking away from generalized assumptions that certain forms of trafficking 
involve harm and others do not. For example, beyond physical violence, the 
application of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment underscores 
the severity of psychological methods such as threats and intimidation as 
well as the fear and uncertainty created by being trafficked—all of which 
appear to occur routinely in a range of trafficking cases. Psychological ill-
treatment within trafficking is often referred to in passing in the literature and 
jurisprudence, but has received very little attention as a legal matter with 
the risk that only cases of trafficking involving overt physical violence are 
taken seriously when they come to the attention of state authorities, resulting 
in under-protection. The extension of the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment to trafficking would therefore provide a vehicle for its fuller 
characterization under international human rights law and an expansion of 
the prevention and protection systems in place for victims. 
While trafficking is typically dealt with under the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude, and forced labor, in certain cases the coverage of this prohibition 
is incomplete. In Part IV therefore, I challenge the European Court’s obiter 
dicta that physical and psychological ill-treatment committed in the context 
of trafficking is and should be covered by the prohibition of slavery, servi-
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tude, or forced labor exclusively. Rather, I argue that a separate application 
of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment is both legally justified 
and appropriate as a policy matter in order to underscore the severity of 
certain victims’ treatment and to recognize the nature of trafficking as a 
multiple violation of international human rights law. Again, when framed 
within the context of states’ due diligence obligations, the fuller application 
of international human rights law should contribute to heightened protection 
of victims. I conclude the article by arguing that advocates of the expansion 
of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment need to refocus efforts 
on the development of the state’s duty to prevent and protect individuals 
from violence by non-state actors rather than the characterization of the 
underlying acts alone.
II. THE PARAMETERS foR APPLYING THE PRoHIBITIoN of 
ToRTURE AND oTHER ILL-TREATMENT To THE ACTS of  
NoN-STATE ACToRS
The prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment can only be engaged where 
a state nexus to the act can be established.22 International human rights law 
does not apply directly to the acts of non-state actors with the exception of 
the acts of non-state actors who exercise effective control of territory, par-
ticularly in the absence of central government.23 As in other cases in which 
advocates seek to characterize an act carried out by a non-state actor as 
a human rights violation, the state nexus requirement is often overlooked 
in favor of a focus on the nature of the act.24 Yet, this is the wrong starting 
point as the satisfaction of the state nexus requirement is a condition prec-
edent to the engagement of international human rights law generally, and 
the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment specifically. This is why a 
move away from a broad assertion that trafficking constitutes torture and 
other ill-treatment to a detailed analysis of its application is so critical to 
providing meaningful protection to victims of the practice.
The state nexus requirement may be satisfied in two ways. First, state 
officials may be involved in trafficking. Such direct involvement is unlikely to 
be the result of an official state policy but rather may emanate from situations 
such as accessing the services of trafficked persons out of working hours and 
corruption and abuse of an official position, for example by guaranteeing 
22. Nigel Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, in HumAn RigHts 
in tHe twenty-fiRst CentuRy: A gLObAL CHALLenge 297, 313 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul 
Mahoney eds., 1993).
23. Elmi v. Australia, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (14 May 1999).
24. Ryszard Piotrowicz, The Legal Nature of Trafficking in Human Beings, 4 inteRCuLtuRAL 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 175 (2009). 
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protection in return for a fee or facilitating entry or exit visas. Even if the 
actions of the official or person acting in an official capacity do not form 
part of a state policy, state responsibility may still ensue as international law 
will attribute acts to the state where officials act with apparent authority,25 
regardless of whether the actions are ultra vires or in contravention of instruc-
tions.26 The corrupt border official example provides the clearest paradigm 
of an ultra vires action.27 However, state responsibility may also extend to 
situations in which the official uses his or her official position to access the 
services of trafficked persons, even if entirely out of working hours, through 
the promise of state inaction or protection.28 
Second, the state nexus requirement may be satisfied through state of-
ficials’ failure to prevent or protect victims of trafficking even if they are 
not directly involved. Articles 1 and 16 of the Convention against Torture 
foresee the satisfaction of the state nexus where acts of torture and other 
ill-treatment are carried out with the consent or acquiescence of an official 
or person acting in an official capacity. The regional human rights bodies 
have advanced a similar formula through the development of the principle 
of due diligence, which in addition to the requirement of the adoption of 
general measures to prevent or protect victims from the acts of non-state 
actors, obligates states to take operational action where they are aware of 
a real and immediate risk to an identifiable individual at the hands of a 
third party.29 Thus, where officials turn a blind-eye30 or fail in their duty to 
prevent or protect a victim of trafficking from a third party,31 the state nexus 
requirement may be satisfied. 
The due diligence principle therefore confirms that acts by non-state 
actors, such as trafficking, are not “unequivocally a human rights viola-
25. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, y.b. int’L L. COmm. vOL. ii, pt. twO 46, art. 7 (2001). 
26. Id. art.7 provides that:
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, 
person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. 
27. See, e.g., reports by the Committee against Torture raising concerns about alleged com-
plicity of the police and border control in trafficking in human beings, CAT, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee against Torture: Kazakhstan, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
KAZ/CO/2 (21 Nov. 2008). 
28. See Anne gALLAgHeR, tHe inteRnAtiOnAL LAw Of HumAn tRAffiCking 227 (2010).
29. Dzemajl v. Yugoslavia, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (2002).
30. nigeL ROdLey witH mAtt pOLLARd, tHe tReAtment Of pRisOneRs undeR inteRnAtiOnAL LAw 89, 92 
(3rd ed. 2009). 
31. During the drafting process, the United States was particularly intent on the inclusion of 
the term acquiescence within the definition of torture to underline the duty to prevent 
torture even if committed by actors other than the state. Economic and Social Council, 
Questions of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, Particularly Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1314 (19 Dec. 1978).
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tion,”32 but only become one through a failure in the state’s duty to prevent 
or protect victims from violence by non-state actors. Despite this important 
point, jurisprudence on due diligence, consent, and acquiescence remains 
thin and underdeveloped. Yet, it is in this realm that international human 
rights law offers the most concrete protection to victims of trafficking as it is 
the point at which the state’s duty to prevent trafficking and protect victims 
is engaged and therefore requires much greater attention. 
This section addresses the circumstances in which a failure to prevent 
or protect victims of trafficking might engage the prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatment. It also underscores that even when engaged, it will have 
limited meaning in practice unless the link between the duty of states to 
adopt general measures to protect victims of trafficking, and the duty to 
take operational measures in specific cases, is strengthened. This is neces-
sary in order to ensure that such cases actually come to the attention of the 
authorities, thus triggering their duty to prevent or protect.
A. The Level of Awareness Required to Make a finding of Torture 
Specifically
The engagement of the prohibition of torture specifically for a failure in a 
duty to prevent or protect victims of trafficking is likely to face significant 
challenges, even where the authorities are aware of concrete allegations of 
the requisite severity. Three ways in which to distinguish torture from other 
ill-treatment have been advanced. First, the European Commission depicted 
inhuman treatment33 as requiring severe pain or suffering, and described 
torture as an aggravated form of inhuman treatment “with the implication 
that some higher threshold of pain and suffering applies to torture than 
does to inhuman treatment.”34 While the Convention against Torture does 
not encapsulate this definition, it continues to appear in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court.35 Second, the Convention against Torture maintains 
a relative severity approach but only requires that torture constitutes severe 
suffering without the element of aggravation thus suggesting a lower thresh-
old than that originally advanced by the European Commission.36 Third, the 
purposive element of torture as set out in Article 1 of the Convention against 
32. Copelon, supra note 3, at 294. See Piotrowicz, supra note 24, for a general discussion 
on the limitations of applying international human rights law to trafficking cases due to 
their principal commission by non-state actors.
33. Inhuman treatment is defined as a component of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment, abbreviated as “other ill-treatment.”
34. ROdLey witH pOLLARd, supra note 30, at 87, 99.
35. See, e.g., Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46, ¶ 426 (8 July 2004). 
36. ROdLey witH pOLLARd, supra note 30, at 99. 
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Torture offers a means to distinguish between torture and other ill-treatment. 
Nigel Rodley and Matt Pollard favor the purposive distinction on its own 
or in conjunction with the second relative severity test but reject the first 
as outdated and no longer applicable.37 Applying the Convention against 
Torture, the European Court often requires the establishment of purpose, 
although not consistently.38 
While distinction on the basis of purpose generally presents a simpler 
process and reduces the risk of arbitrary and subjective assessments of se-
verity, if applicable in trafficking cases, it may result in particular obstacles 
to their characterization as torture specifically. Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture provides an illustrative but not closed list39 of purposes as 
“obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind.” As trafficking does not mirror 
the classical torture setting of state detention, the first purpose is unlikely 
to apply. Rather, the central purpose of the trafficker usually relates to the 
exploitation of the victim through provision of a service for monetary return. 
On its face, the purpose of discrimination appears to present a ground 
on which to characterize at least certain trafficking cases as torture, for ex-
ample, where a woman is trafficked for sexual exploitation or more generally 
because the person is from a group in a position of vulnerability. Indeed, 
it is often argued that the rape of a woman would automatically fulfill the 
purposive element of torture on this basis.40 The difficulty with discrimina-
tion under the Convention definition, however, is that it requires a specific 
purpose of discrimination, as opposed to international human rights law 
more generally which can find discrimination on grounds of discriminatory 
effect. For example, the European Court and Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights have found a violation of the prohibition of other ill-treatment 
and the right to equality and non-discrimination. However, they did so 
by using the separate equality and non-discrimination provision in their 
respective conventions. They were therefore able to find a violation on the 
basis of discriminatory effect as they did not need to use the discriminatory 
purpose element of the torture prohibition.41 As the threshold to satisfy the 
37. Id.
38. The European Court often requires the demonstration of a purpose although not con-
sistently. See, e.g., Salman v. Turkey, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, ¶ 114 (27 June 2000). 
39. mAnfRed nOwAk & eLizAbetH mCARtHuR, tHe united nAtiOns COnventiOn AgAinst tORtuRe: A 
COmmentARy 39 (2008).
40. Clare McGlynn, Rape, Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights, 58 int’L 
& COmp. L. Q. 565, 568 (2009); Copelon, supra note 3, at 322; Nowak Report, supra 
note 15, ¶ 56.
41. See, e.g., Case of González et al. v. Mexico, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts. (ser. C) 
No. 205, ¶¶ 398–402 (16 Nov. 2009) [hereinafter Cotton Field] (finding a violation of 
Article 1(1) on discrimination read together with Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 7(1)); Opuz v. 
Turkey, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28, ¶¶ 179, 200 (9 June 2009) (finding a violation of Article 
14 read together with Article 3, although ruling out a discriminatory intent).
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discriminatory purpose is much higher than that of discriminatory effect, it 
may render this purposive element less far-reaching than is often assumed. 
Where physical or psychological methods are used as a means of co-
ercion, intimidation into compliance, or as punishment for an attempt to 
escape, they would appear sufficient to meet the purposive test. However, 
the travaux preparatoires to the Convention and a range of torture experts 
contend that Article 1 requires a state purpose.42 Rodley with Pollard note 
that, “[i]t is no accident that the purposive element of torture reflects precisely 
state purposes, or, at any rate, the purposes of an organised political entity 
exercising effective power.”43 Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius submit 
that the “words ‘such . . . as’ [in the Convention] imply that the other pur-
poses must have something in common with the purposes expressly listed.”44 
Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur read this to mean that the purpose 
of torture must be to further the interests of the state.45 
The requirement of a state purpose would render the purpose of the 
trafficker irrelevant even if it satisfied the requirements of Article 1. While 
not determinative for the purposes of attribution, it would also appear to 
rule out a characterization of torture where the state official acting under 
apparent authority does so for corrupt purposes or for personal gain only, 
although Burgers and Danelius note that:
it can often be assumed that where a public official performs such an act, there 
is also to some extent a public policy to tolerate or to acquiesce in such acts. 
Only in exceptional cases should it therefore be possible to conclude that the 
infliction of severe pain or suffering by a public official would not constitute 
torture as meant in the definition on the ground that he acted for purely private 
reasons.46 
In due diligence cases, the requirement of a state purpose for a failure to 
prevent or protect a victim from trafficking would exclude almost all cases 
from characterization as torture unless a state policy of purposive discrimi-
nation could be established. Interestingly, whether and how the purposive 
element applies in due diligence cases has been side-stepped by the courts 
so far. In Opuz and Cotton Field, for example, the respective courts simply 
did not consider the possibility that the violations concerned could constitute 
torture and thus did not advance a test for distinguishing between torture and 
other ill-treatment in due diligence cases. In Opuz v. Turkey, despite the ap-
plicant’s submission that the acts amounted to torture,47 the European Court 
42. J. HeRmAn buRgeRs & HAns dAneLius, tHe united nAtiOns COnventiOn AgAinst tORtuRe: A HAnd-
bOOk On tHe COnventiOn AgAinst tORtuRe And OtHeR CRueL, inHumAn OR degRAding tReAtment 
OR punisHment 118 (1988).
43. ROdLey witH pOLLARd, supra note 30, at 88. 
44. buRgeRs & dAneLius, supra note 42, at 118.
45. nOwAk & mCARtHuR, supra note 39, at 39; But cf. buRgeRs & dAneLius, supra note 42, at 
119.
46. buRgeRs & dAneLius, supra note 42, at 119.
47. Opuz, supra note 41, ¶ 155.
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found that the “violence suffered by the applicant, in the form of physical 
injuries and psychological pressure, were sufficiently serious to amount to 
ill-treatment” without even addressing the applicant’s arguments.48 
In her separate opinion in Cotton Field, Judge Medina Quiroga suggests 
that the Inter-American Court’s failure to label the acts as torture derives 
from a reluctance to extend the coverage of the prohibition of torture to 
acts not directly carried out by the state.49 She criticizes this outcome on 
the basis that the Court had, on many previous occasions, made a specific 
finding of torture in cases of similar severity.50 Her assessment dovetails 
with critiques advanced by feminist writers such as Rhonda Copelon who 
questioned “whether state involvement in the commission of the offense is 
the sine qua non of the definition of torture as a violation of international 
human rights.”51
The explicit requirement of a state purpose would appear to set the bar 
unworkably high in due diligence cases. Similarly, the evasive approach of 
the regional human rights tribunals in Cotton Field and Opuz suggests that 
very few, if any, trafficking cases could constitute torture through a failure 
of the duty of due diligence. While the due diligence test had not been 
developed at the time of the adoption of the Convention against Torture, 
both readings appear contrary to its original aims in that the justification 
for a primary focus on torture by state actors was premised on the expecta-
tion that the state would “take action according to its criminal law against 
private persons having committed acts of torture against other persons.”52 
Accordingly, this shortcoming indicates the need for a re-assessment of 
the standards applicable to the classification of acts as torture when state 
responsibility is established through a failure to prevent or protect victims 
from the acts of third parties, which may require a different approach to that 
applied to the direct acts of state officials. For now, however, it suggests that 
states are unlikely to be found responsible under the prohibition of torture 
specifically for a failure to prevent or protect victims of trafficking from the 
acts of non-state actors.
B. The Level of Awareness Required to Engage the Prohibition of other 
Ill-Treatment 
The limitations posed by the application of the prohibition of torture do 
not necessarily extend to the prohibition of other ill-treatment which may 
48. Id. ¶ 161.
49. Concurring Opinion of Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga in Cotton Field, supra note 41, 
¶ 7; see generally McGlynn, supra note 40, at 588. 
50. Cotton Field, supra note 41, ¶ 2. 
51. Copelon, supra note 3, at 342.
52. buRgeRs & dAneLius, supra note 42, at 45.
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be engaged provided the acts are of the requisite severity and the state 
authorities are on notice of them but fail to prevent or protect the victim of 
trafficking. Whether or not the state is on notice of ill-treatment, however, 
not only depends on a case of trafficking coming to its attention but also 
on how it understands what trafficking entails. As this section demonstrates, 
the prohibition of other ill-treatment may be engaged in three ways: first, 
with concrete allegations of ill-treatment; second, through a case fitting a 
pattern of trafficking known to involve ill-treatment; and third, by authorities 
presuming any type of trafficking to involve other ill-treatment. As developed 
in the next section, such a presumption would not derive from physical acts 
of violence which are not apparent in all cases of trafficking but from psy-
chological ill-treatment. The first two scenarios will have limited coverage 
and will be dependent on substantial knowledge and reporting of the type 
of trafficking at issue and may thus result in a narrow understanding of what 
trafficking entails with the accompanying potential for under-protection. The 
third scenario, however, may broaden understanding of the harm involved 
in trafficking regardless of its purpose and composite nature and may result 
in state authorities taking a wider range of trafficking cases seriously, thus 
heightening the protection offered to victims. 
1. Responsibility Where Direct Allegations of Ill-Treatment are Made
Regardless of the possibility of establishing state responsibility for other ill-
treatment and even torture in trafficking cases through the failure to act, that 
possibility will have little meaning if the cases do not come to the attention 
of the authorities. As noted above, states are under an obligation to adopt 
general measures to protect individuals from torture and other ill-treatment 
by state and non-state actors alike.53 Furthermore, in certain circumstances 
they are obligated to undertake operational measures to prevent or protect 
a specific victim where the authorities are aware or should have been aware 
of a specific risk of other ill-treatment. While the latter obligation appears 
far-reaching, its significance (and thus the significance of labeling traffick-
ing as torture or other ill-treatment more generally) may be limited by an 
under-examination of the connection between general and operational 
measures that would increase the likelihood of trafficking cases coming to 
the attention of the authorities.
The requirement of awareness of a risk to an identifiable individual 
presents a high threshold to overcome in order to trigger the duty of the 
state to take operational measures to prevent or protect trafficking victims. 
In the majority of due diligence cases dealt with by the regional human 
rights courts, the authorities became aware of a risk through a complaint 
by the victim or his or her family. Trafficking victims, however, are associ-
53. CAT, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, ¶ 18, U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (24 Jan. 2008).
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ated with low levels of reporting which may be due to a range of factors 
including physical inability to escape to complain, a distrust of authorities 
to protect them if they do complain (a distrust that may be well-founded),54 
and threats and violence used to prevent the reporting of the situation to the 
police, including instilling the belief in victims that they will be prosecuted 
if they do so (which again may be well-founded where the individuals are 
not identified as trafficking victims but treated as illegal immigrants and/or 
engaged in criminal activity).55 Thus, unless the general measures adopted 
by states include tailored complaints mechanisms as well as address ways 
in which states can meet their obligations to independently identify traffick-
ing victims, it is unlikely that many cases will trigger the obligation to take 
operational measures. 
Notably, other than the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights 
and Human Trafficking56 and the UN Draft Basic Principles on the Right to 
a Remedy for Victims of Trafficking,57 the international and regional instru-
ments adopted on trafficking to date pay very little attention to the nature 
of complaint mechanisms and states’ duties to independently identify vic-
tims of trafficking. For example, the Palermo Protocol does not provide for 
complaint mechanisms beyond noting that states should enable victims of 
trafficking to pursue compensation and does not explicitly set out a duty 
to identify victims of trafficking. However, in Rantsev, the European Court 
read Article 10 of the Palermo Protocol, which requires the training of of-
ficials, to find that the Cypriot authorities had failed in their duty of due 
diligence by failing to identify the applicant’s daughter as a potential victim 
of trafficking when she was brought to the police station by the cabaret club 
owner, thus emphasizing the state’s own duty to take proactive measures 
to identify and protect victims.58 The facts of this case are quite peculiar, 
54. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children: Mission to Argentina, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/35/
Add.4 (24 May 2011).
55. Jessica Elliott, (Mis)Identification of Victims of Trafficking: The Case of R v. O, 21 int’L 
J. Refugee L. 727, 732 (2009) (citing HOme OffiCe/sCOttisH gOveRnment, uk ACtiOn pLAn On 
tACkLing HumAn tRAffiCking 48 (2007)). See also Parosha Chandran, The Identification of 
Victims of Trafficking, in HAndbOOk, supra note 19, at 45–6.
56. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines 
on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/2002/68/Add.1 (20 May 
2002).
57. UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially in Women and Children, 
Draft Basic Principles on the Right for an Effective Remedy for Trafficked Persons, Annex 
I, ¶¶ 3, 6(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/35 (13 Apr. 2011) (although notably these Principles 
are more focused on access to justice for the purpose of obtaining reparation rather than 
triggering the duty to take operational measures specifically).
58. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 296. See also Opinion No. 6/2010 of the Group of Experts 
on Trafficking in Human Beings of the European Commission, 20 int’L J. Refugee L. 673, 
674 (2010). 
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however, as the cabaret club owner, allegedly involved in the trafficking at 
the exploitation phase, took the victim to the police station, thus putting the 
police on notice. This is unlikely to happen frequently and therefore does 
not answer the question of how far authorities must go to identify potential 
victims when they do not come to the authorities directly. 
The lack of detailed attention to complaint mechanisms and the duty 
to identify are particular deficiencies that impact the level of engagement 
and protection that international human rights law can offer. Accordingly, 
they require much closer and creative consideration in order to ensure that 
complaints mechanisms are tailored and accessible for victims of traffick-
ing, that they are aware of them, that they are not at risk of prosecution 
themselves, and that protection is not made conditional on cooperation 
with authorities in the prosecution of traffickers. Moreover, the ways in 
which states fulfill their duty to identify trafficking victims requires careful 
consideration in order to ensure that authorities are proactive without using 
this duty to pursue aggressive immigration or anti-prostitution agendas under 
the auspices of the protection of victims of trafficking.59 For the purposes of 
this article, these deficiencies underscore that characterizing trafficking as 
involving other ill-treatment will carry little meaning if direct complaints by 
victims are relied upon to put the state on notice.
2. Responsibility for Other Ill-Treatment Where no Specific Allegation 
of Violence is Made
As set out in the introduction, trafficking involves a wide range of acts not 
all of which necessarily involve physical violence at least that would be 
deemed to reach the threshold of other ill-treatment. In the abstract, there-
fore, if the victim does not disclose the treatment to which he or she has 
been subjected, it may be difficult to assert that trafficking involves acts at 
the level of other ill-treatment or that a presumption in this regard should 
be made, due to the range of treatment that may be involved. 
The situation may be different, however, if the authorities are aware of 
the type of trafficking involved even if they are not on notice of specific 
allegations of violence. For example if the authorities are aware that the 
trafficking is for the purpose of sexual exploitation that could lead to the 
presumption that it involves the commission of acts of the required severity 
under the prohibition of other ill-treatment. While other types of trafficking 
may render such a finding more challenging, this challenge may be over-
come if the state is aware of a broader pattern of similar cases that have 
involved forms of physical or psychological harm that would meet the severity 
59. Janie Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and 
Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 u. pA. L. Rev. 1655, 1666–8 (2010).
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threshold, even if the type of trafficking at issue does not immediately raise 
such concerns. For example, in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the European 
Court held that the state had violated Article 4 (on the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude, and forced labor) as, once the cabaret owner brought the victim 
to the police station, the police failed to inquire whether she might be a 
victim of trafficking,60 but rather returned her to the custody of the cabaret 
club owner.61 The Court found that the police returned her despite their 
awareness both that Ms. Rantseva was a Russian national holding an artiste 
visa,62 and the broader context of the trafficking of foreign women on artiste 
visas, particularly from former Soviet states to Cyprus, for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation by the owners and managers of cabaret clubs.63 While 
the Court declined to consider the applicability of Article 3 (on torture and 
other ill-treatment) in this case, it could be argued that the state’s knowledge 
of the type of trafficking and the particular victim’s profile was sufficient to 
engage the prohibition, given the sexual exploitation typically involved in 
such cases. 
Such a conclusion is supported by the findings of the regional human 
rights courts in other cases concerning due diligence. For example, in Gon-
zalez et al (Cotton Field) v. Mexico, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights noted that before the disappearances at issue in the case were reported 
to the police, the state was aware of a general pattern of violence against 
women and had failed in its obligation to adopt a policy to prevent such 
violence by private actors.64 Due to this contextual knowledge, once the 
disappearances were reported to the police, it found the state responsible on 
the basis that it became aware of a “real and imminent danger for a specific 
. . . group of individuals”65 but failed to take reasonable preventive action.66 
While such an approach would extend the range of cases falling under 
the prohibition beyond direct allegations by victims, it would involve broad 
distinctions between types of trafficking cases and would also be reliant on 
studies of trafficking patterns and may therefore still limit the application of 
the prohibition of other ill-treatment through the principle of due diligence. 
As demonstrated by Rantsev, where trafficking patterns are available (in this 
case, patterns evidenced in reports by the Council of Europe and national 
ombudsman) this could trigger the state’s positive obligations under the 
prohibition of other ill-treatment.67 Reports by the Council of Europe, other 
60. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 296–97.
61. Id. ¶ 298.
62. Id. ¶ 295.
63. Id. ¶ 294.
64. Cotton Field, supra note 41, ¶¶ 242, 279–83, Concurring Opinion of Judge Diego 
Garcia-Sayan, ¶ 11. 
65. Id. ¶ 280.
66. Id. ¶ 284.
67. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 294.
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international, regional, or national bodies may provide important information 
on trafficking patterns. Through a state’s engagement with such reports, it 
is put on notice thus engaging its duty to prevent and protect victims from 
other ill-treatment.68 For example, the United States Department of State’s 
annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report documents the extent to which 
185 states of origin, transit, or destination, including the United States itself, 
provide adequate preventive and protective measures for victims of trafficking, 
and details the continuing deficiencies of national law and practice in this 
regard.69 Anne Gallagher observes that while the quality, evidential support, 
and detail of the TIP reports have improved since their inception in 2001, 
they still suffer from deficiencies in their coverage of the types of traffick-
ing cases at issue in certain states (particularly beyond trafficking for sexual 
exploitation) and the measures taken to prevent and protect victims.70 In the 
context of deportation decisions, Gallagher and others also argue that the 
reports can be over-relied upon by national judiciaries to justify removing 
asylum applicants, even where the TIP reports only indicate an improvement 
in a state’s ability or willingness to prevent and protect victims of trafficking 
from reprisals or re-trafficking rather than a full compliance with their due 
diligence obligations.71 Through such over reliance on the information in 
TIP reports as if they are sources of “definitive statement[s] of fact,”72 there 
is a risk that patterns will not be fully identified. Thus, while country reports 
increase the likelihood of state knowledge or constructive knowledge of ill-
treatment in certain types of trafficking cases, information of patterns still 
may not always be publicly available. This route to the establishment of state 
responsibility would also exclude individual cases, which do not form a part 
of a broader pattern, from the coverage of the prohibition of ill-treatment, thus 
emphasizing the limitations of the prohibition when engaged on this basis.
Accordingly, where state authorities do not have concrete allegations or 
are not able to make presumptions from the type of trafficking at issue, how 
trafficking is understood and the severity with which it is treated in general 
may play a critical role in their response and the seriousness with which 
they treat cases. If trafficking is dealt with narrowly to focus on physical 
violence, it could lead to under-protection since, as discussed in the next 
68. Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: A Reflection on the Influence 
and Evolution of the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Reports, in fROm HumAn RigHts tO HumAn 
tRAffiCking: RefRAming COntempORARy sLAveRy 172, 190 (Alison Brysk & Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick 
eds., 2012). 
69. See us stAte dep’t, tRAffiCking in peRsOns RepORt (2012). 
70. Id. at 179, 181.
71. See Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking, supra note 68, at 184. See also 
Anna Dorevitch & Michelle Foster, Obstacles on the Road to Protect: Assessing the 
Treatment of Sex-Trafficking Victims under Australia’s Migration and Refugee Law, 9 
meLbOuRne J. int’L L. 1, 22–24 (2008).
72. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking, supra note 68, at 188.
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section, not all cases of trafficking involve physical violence. However, 
the prohibition of other ill-treatment can provide wider coverage when 
properly applied to include psychological ill-treatment which, as discussed 
in the next section, appears to occur most frequently and reflect a greater 
degree of commonality between the varying types of cases of trafficking, 
than physical violence. Focusing on psychological ill-treatment would pro-
vide all trafficking cases with a presumptive baseline of severity and would 
largely avoid the need to unpick each case of trafficking to assess the level 
of violence involved. However, a significant conceptual shift is still needed 
to fully appreciate psychological harm, particularly as the jurisprudence and 
standards on psychological methods alone as torture and other ill-treatment 
are underdeveloped. 
Thus, state responsibility for other ill-treatment may be established where 
the authorities knew or ought to have known that the trafficking involved 
violence of such severity to engage the prohibition of other ill-treatment and 
failed to act. The outstanding question remains whether courts will derive 
such knowledge in the absence of specific allegations from specific types 
of trafficking cases or whether they will infer all trafficking cases to involve 
such a risk due to the psychological methods of ill-treatment often involved.
3. Multiple State Responsibility for Other Ill-Treatment
A related issue concerns which state(s)’ responsibility is engaged under the 
prohibition of other ill-treatment given that trafficking can constitute a multi-
jurisdictional practice. One approach might be to find that each state is only 
responsible for the physical and/or psychological harm that occurs on its 
territory or under its control. However, this approach may be under-inclusive, 
for example, in cases in which the acts take place in the territory or under 
the control of the destination country but where the (in)action of the state 
of origin and/or transit contributes to the ultimate exposure of the victim to 
such treatment. Article 47 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 recognizes 
the possibility of multiple state responsibility “for the wrongful conduct as a 
whole.”73 Therefore, a finding would not be barred on that ground.
However, it may still prove challenging to establish state responsibil-
ity in the country of origin when acts that could constitute torture or other 
ill-treatment have not yet taken place. Where a state is both on notice that 
a person has been abducted or taken by force on its territory and it knows 
or ought to have known that the circumstances fit a broader pattern of 
cases that have led to trafficking, it may be found responsible for a failure 
73. JAmes CRAwfORd, tHe inteRnAtiOnAL LAw COmmissiOn ARtiCLes On stAte RespOnsibiLity: intROduCtiOn, 
text And COmmentARies 272 (2005).
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to prevent or protect the person from being trafficked. It may also be found 
responsible for a failure to protect or prevent the victim from any torture or 
other ill-treatment committed subsequently, where it can be established that 
had it taken preventative action, the person would likely not have been traf-
ficked. Again, however, this may be limited to cases in which the state has 
knowledge of the type of trafficking involved or broader patterns of torture 
and other ill-treatment in similar cases.
Where an individual leaves a state voluntarily only to later discover that 
he or she has been deceived, however, it may be more difficult to establish 
the responsibility of the state of origin. In such cases, the state may not be 
on notice of the departure at all, particularly where it does not issue exit 
visas. Moreover, states generally cannot deny citizens their right to free-
dom of movement and to leave a state’s territory. For example, in Rantsev 
v. Cyprus and Russia, the applicant alleged that Russia had failed to take 
“the necessary measures to protect Ms. Rantseva from the risk of trafficking 
and exploitation.”74 The Court found that it could examine Russia’s actions 
as the alleged trafficking commenced in Russia,75 but noted that “although 
Russian authorities appear to have been aware of the general problem of 
young women being trafficked to work in the sex industry in foreign States, 
there is no evidence that . . . there was a real and immediate risk to Ms. 
Rantseva herself prior to her departure for Cyprus.”76 
In such cases, it is difficult to see how it could be held responsible for 
eventual violence committed in another state, particularly if as in the case 
of Rantsev, “the Russian authorities took steps to warn citizens of traffick-
ing risks.”77 Equally, however, the state of origin may be found liable for a 
procedural violation of the prohibition if the type of trafficking or patterns 
appeared to engage the prohibition and the authorities had not investigated 
and taken general measures to address recruitment on its territory. For ex-
ample, in Rantsev, the Court found that “the Russian authorities therefore had 
an obligation to investigate the possibility that individual agents or networks 
operating in Russia were involved in trafficking Ms. Rantseva to Cyprus.”78 
Accordingly, as this section has shown, establishing that the prohibition 
of torture and other ill-treatment is engaged in cases of trafficking (and other 
cases involving acts by non-state actors) is complex and nuanced and can-
not simply be assumed by the nature of the underlying act. By analyzing 
its application to the case of trafficking, however, the underdevelopment 
of the law on due diligence is exposed and it is at this juncture that much 
greater attention is needed in trafficking cases and non-state actor cases 
more generally.
74. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 207.
75. Id. ¶ 207.
76. Id. ¶ 305.
77. Id. ¶ 305.
78. Id. ¶ 307.
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III. THE SATISfACTIoN of THE SEvERITY THRESHoLD IN SoME BUT 
NoT ALL TRAffICkING CASES
Once the starting point of focusing on the state’s responsibility to prevent 
and protect victims of trafficking is clear, the prohibition of other ill-treatment 
at least can make a significant contribution to how trafficking is understood 
and the seriousness with which it is treated—in all its varied forms—by 
authorities. An accurate portrayal of trafficking within international human 
rights law should have the effect of focusing states’ activities on enhancing 
the prevention and protection mechanisms in place, including ensuring that 
they are able to identify and respond effectively to the needs of victims of 
the full range of trafficking cases through effective complaint mechanisms 
and independent means.
In many instances, narratives of violence experienced in cases of traf-
ficking align with the types of treatment that courts and international bod-
ies consider to fall within the ambit of the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment. Thus, as noted above, where the victim provides detail of his 
or her treatment or the purpose of the trafficking or the types of violence 
associated with the type of trafficking is documented, the satisfaction of 
the severity threshold of the prohibition of other ill-treatment should be 
clear. Physical manifestations of violence present the most obvious cases in 
which the prohibition would be engaged, although, as discussed below, the 
composite nature of trafficking means that physical violence varies greatly 
between different forms of trafficking and in individual cases. Accordingly, 
any assertion that all trafficking involves physical violence that would meet 
the severity threshold of torture and other ill-treatment would seem inaccu-
rate. Equally, while psychological methods of coercion and intimidation as 
well as the fear and uncertainty associated with trafficking appear to reflect 
a more consistent feature,79 their legal significance has been underplayed 
to date. This is an area in which the prohibition of other ill-treatment might 
be of particular relevance and contribute to a fuller recognition of victims’ 
experience within the trafficking process and an individualized and wid-
ened understanding by states of the nature of trafficking and the response 
all cases require.
A. Physical violence During Trafficking as Torture and other  
Ill-Treatment
Beatings and other forms of physical violence employed to abduct, intimidate, 
or prevent or punish attempts to escape present obvious examples of the 
79. Skrivankova supra note 19, at 55.
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types of violence that might be of sufficient severity to constitute torture or 
other ill-treatment. This level of severity may be reached by a single instance 
or an accumulation of physical violence.80
The commission of rape either as a means of exploitation or on a 
singular or repeated basis, through opportunism, for example, in cases of 
domestic servitude in which women may be “raped by male members of 
the family . . . as a means of control and assertion of power,”81 presents a 
clear example of a physical act of violence that would reach the threshold 
of other ill-treatment, if not torture. Although less attention has been paid 
to other acts of sexual violence, presumably they would also fall with the 
definition, either singularly or on a cumulative basis.82 
While trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation tends to receive 
the most attention, as already noted, trafficking encompasses a broader 
range of practices including trafficking into agriculture, domestic service, 
restaurants, hotels, manufacturing, and construction.83 Very little jurispru-
dence exists on whether the nature of the labor itself, particularly hard 
labor and excessive hours, might violate the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment, although presumably the argument could be made in certain 
cases, particularly if on a cumulative basis. Similarly, the forced use of drugs 
or forced organ removal could also fall within the definition.
Thus, in a number of cases acts of physical violence carried out at any 
point in the trafficking process may reach the severity threshold of the pro-
hibition of torture and other ill-treatment. Equally, as noted above, broad 
assertions that all trafficking involves violence of this nature would not be 
possible, thus limiting determinations of severity to the facts of individual 
cases and possibly to certain types of trafficking such as trafficking for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation.
B. Psychological Methods of Torture and other Ill-Treatment
Beyond physical acts of violence, the psychological dimension to the pro-
hibition of torture and other ill-treatment may be particularly relevant in 
80. ROdLey witH pOLLARd, supra note 30.
81. Skrivankova, supra note 19, at 55.
82. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶ 
306 (25 Nov. 2006).
83. See Alice Edwards, Traffic in Human Beings: At the Intersection of Criminal Justice, 
Human Rights, Asylum/Migration and Labor 36 denv. J. int’L L. & pOL’y 9, 45–46 (2007) 
(discussing the limited focus on trafficking to date as an “anti-prostitution instrument”); 
Grace Chang and Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking: 
New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 stAn. J.C.R. & C.L. 317, 320–23 
(2007) (critiquing US enforcement agencies purported focus on trafficking of sex work-
ers); Munro, supra note 19, at 92; Skrivankova, supra note 19, at 49. 
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trafficking cases. Common psychological methods used in the trafficking 
process include threats of physical violence, deportation and imprisonment 
of the trafficked person and his or her family if any attempt to escape or 
complaint is made, cutting off the person from the outside world completely 
either through actual restraint or the employment of psychological means 
of control, the uncertainty and fear associated with such isolation, or other 
subtler methods of control and manipulation.84 
Such psychological methods mirror many of those used in the more 
traditional scenarios of torture and other ill-treatment by state actors. For 
example, Herman Reyes points to particularly severe forms of psychologi-
cal ill-treatment such as threats of torture and/or death made against the 
person and/or his or her family, solitary confinement, or sleep deprivation, 
which may constitute torture or other ill-treatment.85 He also refers to other 
methods that may appear relatively “minor” on their own such as “constant 
taunting; verbal abuse; intimidations . . . petty and less petty harassments 
. . . verbal threats of further torment,” but when grouped together “form 
a system deliberately designed to wear and break down, and ultimately 
also to disrupt the senses and personality” and emphasizes that “the use of 
cumulative methods over time is aggravated both by the unpredictability of 
the situation and by the total lack of any real control.”86 
As with these more traditional cases, psychological methods of ill-
treatment may be used in trafficking cases in conjunction with physical 
forms. As Reyes notes, this reality has led to jurisprudential deficiencies in 
which courts often fail to clearly assert whether and when psychological 
methodology alone would meet the severity threshold of torture and other 
ill-treatment due to their tendency to deal with both physical and psychologi-
cal forms of torture and other ill-treatment together.87 He argues that the lack 
of separation risks the portrayal of torture as “mainly a ‘physical phenom-
enon.’”88 Equally, some jurisprudence has emerged on when psychological 
violence alone would constitute other ill-treatment. For example, in the case 
of Gaefgen v. Germany, the European Court found that the threat alone of 
“real and immediate” ill-treatment over the course of ten minutes which 
was “premeditated and calculated in a deliberate and intentional manner” 
in the context of police custody and thus a “state of vulnerability” although 
84. buRgeRs & dAneLius, supra note 42; Nowak Report, supra note 15, ¶ 56.
85. Hernan Reyes, The Worst Scars are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 int’L Rev. 
Red CROss 591 (2007).
86. Id. at 612. 
87. Id. at 601. Examples of this approach include, Estrella v. Uruguay, Hum. Rts. Comm., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990), ¶ 8.3; Akkoc v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, ¶ 
116; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, ¶ 146 (7 
Sep. 2004).
88. Reyes, supra note 85, at 602.
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without any evidence of “long-term adverse psychological consequences” 
constituted inhuman treatment.89 Such findings are particularly important in 
the trafficking context as psychological methods appear to reflect the more 
consistent feature between diverse cases, some of which may not involve 
physical violence. 
Finally, in extreme cases in which victims have been abducted, are 
unable to contact the outside world, and their families do not know of 
their whereabouts, the process as a whole may be considered to violate 
the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. While this argument has 
not yet been considered in a judicial or quasi-judicial forum in relation to 
trafficking specifically, parallels may be drawn from the jurisprudence on 
enforced disappearance. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee 
has repeatedly found that the practice of enforced disappearance in and of 
itself constitutes a violation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights90 as a result of the “degree of suffering involved in 
being held indefinitely without contact with the outside world.”91
From the foregoing, the employment of physical and psychological meth-
ods of torture and other ill-treatment in some but not all cases of trafficking 
either as a means of control, as a form of exploitation, or simply because 
of the opportunity presented would satisfy the severity requirement of the 
prohibition of other ill-treatment. Understanding the experience of victims 
from this perspective can therefore expand the protection offered by inter-
national human rights law as a result; heighten the seriousness with which 
authorities treat potential cases of all forms of trafficking not just those in 
which physical violence is evident or assumed and potentially impact upon 
the level of reparation states are obligated to provide where a violation of 
the duty of due diligence is found.
Iv. THE APPRoPRIATENESS of APPLYING THE PRoHIBITIoN of 
ToRTURE AND oTHER ILL-TREATMENT To TRAffICkING CASES
While certain acts and possibly the process as a whole could fall within 
the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, as set out in the introduc-
tion, to date trafficking has been dealt with under the prohibition of slavery, 
servitude, and forced labor. Accordingly, it remains necessary to establish 
whether both prohibitions can apply to trafficking cases and whether this 
is normatively desirable. 
89. Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 101–08 (1 June 2010).
90. See, e.g., Madhoui v. Algeria, ¶ 7.4, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/94/D/1495/2006 (1 Dec. 2008).
91. Alwani v. Libya, ¶ 6.5, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004 (29 
Aug. 2007). 
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The majority, if not all, trafficking cases are covered by the prohibition 
of slavery, servitude, and forced labor. This may have been the reason be-
hind the European Court’s finding in Rantsev that it did not need to specify 
which aspect of Article 4 (on the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced 
labor) was violated.92 While trafficking is often referred to as “slavery” or 
a “slavery-like”93 practice, as of yet, no court has found that it constitutes 
slavery although the jurisprudence remains embryonic such that definitive 
conclusions cannot yet be drawn. A “small fraction”94 of trafficking cases 
may fall under the prohibition of slavery, although the size of the fraction 
will depend on the definition of slavery adopted. Ownership is generally 
considered to constitute the central element to slavery.95 On its most restric-
tive reading, this element limits the coverage of the prohibition to chattel 
ownership and would thus exclude most cases of trafficking.96 However, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Kunarac 
found that the definition extends to situations involving the exercise of rights 
associated with ownership rather than ownership of chattel alone.97 This 
reading would encompass both de jure and de facto ownership thereby 
covering more cases if a factual situation of ownership could be proven, 
despite the lack of recognition before the law.98 
While trafficking may not always meet the definition of slavery, courts 
appear more willing to treat the practice as servitude or forced labor. The 
International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Convention No. 29 provides that 
forced or compulsory labor is “all work or service which is exacted from 
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person 
has not offered himself voluntarily.”99 Many cases of trafficking are likely 
92. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 279.
93. James Hathaway, The Human Rights “Quagmire” of Human Trafficking, 49 vA .J. int’L L. 
1, 7 (2008) (characterizing trafficking as a sub-set of slavery but noting the constraints 
of the Palermo Protocol in this respect); Anne Gallagher, Using International Human 
Rights Law to Better Protect Victims of Trafficking: The Prohibitions of Slavery, Servitude, 
Forced Labour and Debt Bondage, in tHe tHeORy And pRACtiCe Of inteRnAtiOnAL CRiminAL LAw: 
essAys in HOnOuR Of m. CHeRif bAssiOuni 397 (Leila Nadya Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 
2008). 
94. Chuang, supra note 59, at 1709.
95. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, art. 1(1), adopted 25 Sept. 1926, 
60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force 9 Mar. 1927) (providing that “[s]lavery is the status 
or condition of a person over whom any or all the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.”); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
Slave Trade and Institutions of Similar Practices, art. 7(a) adopted 7 Sept. 1956, 226 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 30 Apr. 1957) (maintaining this focus); see Jean Allain, 
The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOw. L. J. 239, 241 (2009). 
96. Siliadin v. France, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, ¶122 (26 July 2005) (finding that slavery required 
the exercise of “a genuine right of legal ownership . . . reducing her to the status of an 
‘object.’”).
97. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23& IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, ¶¶ 117–19 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 12 June 2002).
98. Allain, supra note 95, at 258.
99. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29), art. 2(1), 39 U.N.T.S. 
55, entered into force 1 May 1932. See also Stummer v. Austria, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11, ¶ 
118 (7 July 2011) (noting that Article 4(2) of the Convention bears “a striking similarity” 
to this definition).
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to violate the prohibition of forced labor although questions persist over 
certain practices such as trafficking for sexual exploitation, due to issues 
surrounding whether sexual exploitation can constitute work100 and organ 
removal.101 Thus, while it may provide more expansive coverage, it is by no 
means comprehensive.
Finally, like slavery, servitude is an absolute prohibition that appears to 
sit between slavery and forced labor as a catch-all provision. The UNODC 
Model Law against Trafficking in Persons defines servitude as “the labour 
conditions and/or the obligation to work or to render services from which the 
person in question cannot escape and which he or she cannot change.”102 
Since it refers to services as well as labor, it may apply to the forms of traf-
ficking not covered by forced labor and thus fill in any gaps left by slavery 
and forced labor. As set out in the introduction, the European Court found 
in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia that:
There is no evidence that Ms Rantseva was subjected to ill-treatment prior to 
her death. However, it is clear that the use of violence and the ill-treatment of 
victims are common features of trafficking . . . . The Court therefore considers 
that, in the absence of any specific allegation of ill-treatment, any inhuman 
or degrading treatment suffered by Ms Rantseva prior to her death was inher-
ently linked to the alleged trafficking and exploitation. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that it is not necessary to consider separately the applicant’s Article 
3 complaint and will deal with the general issues raised in the context of its 
examination of the applicant’s complaint under Article 4 of the Convention.103
These obiter dicta can be read in two ways. First, that the Court suggests 
that it would not be legally possible to use the same set of facts to find a 
violation of both Article 3 on the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment 
and Article 4 on the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor as 
Article 4 subsumes such acts if “inherently linked to the alleged trafficking 
and exploitation.”104 Alternatively, that as a matter of “procedural economy” 
acts that would normally violate Article 3 should only be considered under 
Article 4.105 This section therefore considers whether space exists for the dual 
100. Gallagher, Using International Human Rights Law, supra note 93, at 26 (noting that “the 
reluctance to identify typical end results of trafficking, particularly sex work, as labor 
is one reason for this failure to mount what would appear to be a fairly obvious line 
of attack” referring to the low use of the prohibition of forced and compulsory labor 
in trafficking cases). See also Munro, supra note 19, at 96; Jo Doezema, Now You See 
Her, Now You Don’t: Sex Workers at the UN Trafficking Protocol Negotiation, 14 sOC. 
& Leg. s. 61 (2005).
101. inteRnAtiOnAL LAbOuR ORgAnisAtiOn (iLO), fORCed LAbOuR And HumAn tRAffiCking CAsebOOk Of 
COuRt deCisiOns 9 (2009).
102. UNODC, Model Law against Trafficking in Persons, art. 5(1)(r), V.09-81990 (E) (5 Aug. 
2009).
103. Rantsev, supra note 16, ¶ 252. 
104. Id. 
105. Karl Joseph Partsch, Discrimination, in tHe euROpeAn system fOR tHe pROteCtiOn Of HumAn 
RigHts 571, 583 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993) (discussing 
this approach in relation to Article 14).
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application of the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor and the 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. The resolution of this question 
presents an issue of key importance to understanding the rationale for re-
sorting to the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment in the first place.
1. The Legal Space for the Dual Application of the Prohibitions of 
Torture and Other Ill-Treatment and Slavery, Servitude, and Forced 
Labor 
An analysis of whether the definition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor 
has to encompass physical violence or psychological methods of ill-treatment 
such as intimidation, threats, and the fear and uncertainty associated with 
trafficking are frustrated by the minimal jurisprudence on slavery, servitude, 
and forced labor generally,106 and the even fewer cases that raise physi-
cal and/or psychological methods of fear and intimidation on their facts. 
For example, until Siliadin and Rantsev, none of the cases decided by the 
European Court under Article 4 of the Convention alleged ill-treatment but 
rather related to whether the work at issue fell within the scope of Article 
4(2) on forced labor. 
As discussed above, the legal definitions of slavery, servitude, and forced 
labor focus on the juridical status and level of ownership and control as-
serted over a person.107 Thus, a simple distinction might be made between 
the two prohibitions to allow their parallel application. On the one hand, 
the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor could be treated as ad-
dressing the levels of control of the person, and on the other, the prohibition 
of torture and other ill-treatment as dealing with the severity of treatment 
employed against a person within such a context. Indeed, in Kunarac, the 
ICTY observed that:
Slavery may exist even without torture. Slaves may be well fed, well clothed, 
and comfortably housed, but they are still slaves if without lawful process they 
are deprived of their freedom by forceful restraint. We might eliminate all proof 
of ill-treatment, overlook the starvation, beatings, and other barbarous acts, but 
the admitted fact of slavery—compulsory uncompensated labour—would still 
remain. There is no such thing as benevolent slavery. Involuntary servitude, even 
if tempered by humane treatment, is still slavery.108
106. ILO, supra note 101, at 7 (noting that “situations of state-imposed forced labour or prison 
labour almost never end up in court. Nor are there any cases contained here involving 
traditional chattel slavery.”).
107. gALLAgHeR, tHe inteRnAtiOnAL LAw Of HumAn tRAffiCking, supra note 28, at 182.
108. Kunarac, supra note 97, ¶ 123 (citing U.S. v. Oswald Pohl and Others, Judgment (3 
Nov. 1947) in tRiALs Of wAR CRiminALs befORe tHe nuRembeRg miLitARy tRibunALs undeR COntROL 
COunCiL nO. 10, Vol. 5 (1949)).
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This observation suggests that any physical or psychological acts em-
ployed while a person is held as a slave fall outside of the legal definition of 
slavery and should therefore be dealt with elsewhere in the applicable law 
(in this case, international criminal law). Such a distinction would be akin 
to that made between the legality of a person’s detention and the treatment 
received while in detention. 
However, the assessment is complicated by the role played by any 
physical or psychological ill-treatment as indicia of slavery, servitude, and 
forced labor. In Kunarac, for example, despite the analysis advanced above, 
the ICTY set out the indicia of slavery as including acts which may violate 
the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment as:
[C]ontrol of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychologi-
cal control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or 
coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and 
abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.109 
As an “[i]ndicator of enslavement” the ILO also observes that the 
consent or free will of the victim is absent. It is often rendered impossible or 
irrelevant by, for example: the threat or use of forced or other forms of coercion; 
the fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of power; the victim’s 
position of vulnerability . . . [and] psychological oppression.110 
The inclusion of physical and psychological acts that may meet the thresh-
old of torture or other ill-treatment as indicia of slavery potentially provides 
support for the first interpretation of Rantsev on the basis that the same facts 
cannot be used twice to find two separate violations.
In Siliadin v. France, the European Court found violations of both the 
prohibition of forced labor and the prohibition of servitude. Its finding of 
servitude involved “an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed 
by the use of coercion,”111 taking into account factors such as the number 
of hours in the day that the applicant was required to work, her status as a 
vulnerable minor without resources, her lack of consent, the confiscation of 
her documentation, the threats of arrest, and her inability to leave the house 
except to take the children to school.112 If coercion constitutes the central 
109. Id. ¶ 119 (citing with approval Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-
T, Judgment, ¶543 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 22 Feb. 2001).
110. ILO, supra note 101, at 20.
111. Siliadin, supra note 96, ¶124.
112. Id. ¶¶ 124–29. See Holly Cullen, Silidian v. France: Positive Obligations under Article 
4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 585, 592 (2006) 
(arguing that that Article 4 of the European Convention does not present three distinct 
concepts and that the lines between slavery, servitude, and forced labor are more blurred 
than would initially appear. She interprets the Court in Siliadin to therefore allow “the 
concept of servitude to fill any gap between” slavery and forced labor).
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element of servitude, the relationship between the prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatment and servitude is even more pronounced, as the means of 
coercion used may be physical and psychological acts that reach the level 
of torture or other ill-treatment.
The Court’s finding of forced labor turned on the threats made to the 
applicant of the “menace of [a] penalty” of arrest, the promise of regular-
ization of her visa status, and her lack of consent to the work required of 
her.113 While it appeared to reserve the more severe aspects of the appli-
cant’s treatment to its finding of servitude, it nonetheless commented that 
forced labor “brings to mind the idea of physical or mental constraint,”114 
thus suggesting a potential overlap. The ILO has also noted that physical 
violence and/or psychological methods of threats and intimidation can act 
as indicators of forced labor.115 Similarly, in Krnojelac, the ICTY used a dif-
ferent definition of forced labor focused only on involuntariness which it 
found satisfied through a “climate of fear” which was maintained through 
a range of physical and psychological methodologies.116 
Accordingly, acts that may violate the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment form part of the indicia used to establish slavery, servitude, and 
forced labor. In such cases, it might be argued that the acts cannot then be 
used again to reach a finding of torture or other ill-treatment. This would 
then mean that the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment would only 
be relevant in trafficking cases if it could be demonstrated that the acts at 
issue were performed gratuitously and thus unrelated to the overall status 
of ownership or control. An argument on this basis is unlikely to succeed, 
however, as it would necessitate complicated assessments of when the sta-
tus of slavery, servitude, or forced labor was secured in order to argue that 
anything subsequent was unrelated to the maintenance of such a position. 
It is improbable that it would be possible to point to such a moment in time 
as control is more likely to emanate from an ongoing set of factors or as the 
ICTY framed it, a prevailing climate of fear.
At least in the international criminal law context, the ICTY has allowed 
for the simultaneous application of both prohibitions in cases in which 
physical violence and psychological methods of threats and intimidation 
act as indicators of slavery, servitude, and forced labor. In Krnojelac, for 
example, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s finding of per-
secution as a crime against humanity on the basis of the living conditions 
of the detainees, including “isolation,” “overcrowding,” “lack of protection 
from the cold,” “undernourishment,” “lack or insufficiency of medical care,” 
113. Siliadin, supra note 96, ¶¶ 117–20. 
114. Id. ¶ 117 (citing Van der Mussle v. Belgium, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 34 (1983)).
115. Skrivankova, supra note 19, at 55.
116. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, ¶194 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the Former Yugoslavia 17 
Sept. 2003).
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“psychological suffering,” and “effects of these conditions on the detainees’ 
physical and psychological state.”117 It also upheld the finding of the Trial 
Chamber of superior responsibility for the beatings of the detainees118 and 
reversed the acquittals of torture.119
The key hurdle to applying both seems to be the concern about avoiding 
multiple convictions based on the same facts.120 However, there is another 
way to consider this. The Appeals Chamber, despite its frequent protestations, 
actually used the same facts to make a finding of forced labor in addition 
to the finding of torture and other ill-treatment.121 Taking into account the 
totality of the detention conditions, including the torture of certain detain-
ees and the fear of other detainees that they would be subjected to similar 
treatment, it found that “a reasonable trier of fact should have arrived at the 
conclusion that the detainees’ general situation negated any possibility of 
free consent.”122 Such an interpretation would thus allow the employment of 
the same underlying facts to find a violation of torture and other ill-treatment 
and slavery, servitude, or forced labor. 
The foregoing suggests that the indicia merely form part of the evidence 
that contributes to the establishment of a situation of forced labor rather 
than constituting an intrinsic part of its definition. The reasoning employed 
by the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac supports this conclusion. In that case, 
it found that a lack of consent does not constitute an element of the crime 
of slavery which is concerned with ownership and therefore does not need 
to be proven. However, it acknowledged its relevance “from an evidential 
point of view as going to the question whether the Prosecutor has established 
the element of the crime.”123 This appears to be the most accurate legal 
reading of the relationship from both the perspective of the prohibition of 
slavery, servitude, and forced labor and the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment, and would therefore reject the first interpretation of the Euro-
pean Court’s obiter dicta in Rantsev. Thus no legal barrier would appear to 
exist to the simultaneous finding of slavery, servitude, or forced labor, and 
torture or other ill-treatment in trafficking cases.
2. The Policy Reasons for the Dual Application of Both Prohibitions 
Such a conclusion still requires the consideration of the second interpretation 
of the obiter dicta in Rantsev that as a policy matter only the primary viola-
117. Id. at 24, n.61 (citing Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, ¶¶ 134, 135, 137, 139, 141, 
142–43, 146–48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 15 Mar. 2002). 
118. Id. ¶ 188.
119. Id. ¶ 172.
120. See, e.g., id. ¶ 188.
121. Id. ¶ 191.
122. Id. ¶ 194.
123. Kunarac, supra note 97, ¶ 120.
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tion should be addressed. Where physical violence or psychological methods 
of threats and intimidation reach the severity threshold of torture and other 
ill-treatment, a failure to address them separately under the prohibition of 
torture and other ill-treatment would underplay their commission and leave 
the extent of the suffering unacknowledged, even if a finding as serious 
and stigmatized as slavery was reached. As the ICTY noted in Kunarac, a 
finding of slavery, servitude, and forced labor is not dependent on violence 
at the level of torture and other ill-treatment although it may contribute to 
the evidence needed to make such a finding. The failure to consider acts 
reaching the threshold of torture or other ill-treatment separately would 
equate such cases to those in which other indicia of slavery, servitude, or 
forced labor were at play. This would suggest that violence at the level of 
torture and other ill-treatment was merely incidental to the overall situation 
of slavery, servitude, or forced labor and would thus seriously diminish the 
severity with which it was treated. 
More broadly, insistence on the treatment of trafficking under one provi-
sion of international human rights law fails to recognize its composite and 
diverse nature. As noted at the outset, trafficking encompasses a wide range 
of cases and situations that may not be conducive to containment within 
one prohibition in international human rights law. For example, Vanessa 
Munro points to empirical work that “indicates a substantial variability 
in the treatment of its victims.”124 Similarly, Alice Edwards argues that the 
Palermo Protocol may be “too blunt an instrument” to capture the myriad 
types of trafficking that may require “distinct responses and solutions.”125 
In the same way, one provision of international human rights law may not 
capture the full extent of the victim’s suffering. Notably, while more recent 
literature and jurisprudence focuses on the prohibition of slavery, servitude, 
and forced labor, a study conducted by David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery 
International in 2000 treated trafficking as a multiple human rights viola-
tion potentially involving violations of the right to liberty and security of 
the person, the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment,126 “the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence,” the “right of 
access to the courts and to fair trial,”127 the right to marry and to establish 
a family, and the right to “freedom of expression, their right to receive and 
impart information, their right of peaceful assembly, and their freedom of 
association.”128 
124. Vanessa Munro, Of Rights and Rhetoric: Discussions of Degradation and Exploitation 
in the Context of Sex Trafficking, 35 J. L. & sOC’y 240, 249 (2008).
125. Edwards, supra note 83, at 15. 
126. UN Commission on Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Updated Review 
of the Implementation of and Follow-Up to the Conventions on Slavery: Working Paper 
Prepared by Mr. David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery International, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/2000/3 (26 May 2000). 
127. Id. ¶ 25.
128. Id. ¶ 26.
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Such an approach presents the optimal legal and policy approach to the 
treatment of trafficking under international human rights law which would 
include the application of the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment 
in appropriate cases even where a finding of slavery, servitude, or forced 
labor is made. This is important for three reasons. First, slavery, servitude, 
or forced labor may only be deemed to have occurred at the exploitation 
stage of the trafficking process.129 If this is the case, the means of securing 
the person and any physical or psychological ill-treatment employed en 
route to the destination country may not be covered. Second, even during 
the exploitation stage, as discussed above, a finding of slavery, servitude, 
or forced labor would not necessarily cover the range of potential human 
rights violations that may be committed. Third, properly characterizing traf-
ficking under international human rights law will focus states’ attention on 
the seriousness of the crime and their duty in preventing its commission and 
protecting victims. It will also ensure that compensation and other forms 
of reparation are accurately calculated taking into account the full extent 
of the harm.
v. CoNCLUSIoN
In responding to the developments before the Committee against Torture, the 
UN Special Rapporteur, and the European Court, this article has demonstrated 
that while the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment can make a sig-
nificant contribution to the characterization of trafficking under international 
human rights law, its applicability is complex and nuanced. Much depends 
on the applicable tests employed for engaging states’ responsibility through 
due diligence and the willingness of courts and human rights’ bodies to 
treat psychological methods such as threats, intimidation, and inducing fear 
and uncertainty, in particular, as torture and other ill-treatment. While these 
limitations do not call into question the utility and strategic value of resort-
ing to the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, they underline the 
need to avoid blanket assertions that a particular provision of international 
human rights law, such as the prohibition of torture, applies, in favor of the 
treatment of trafficking as a multiple human rights violation within which the 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment may, but not always, play a part. 
Accordingly, the European Court’s obiter dicta and the findings of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Committee against Torture should not 
only be read as confirmation that in some instances trafficking may violate 
the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment but as a catalyst for the 
129. Jean Allain, Book Review: Silvia Scarpa, Trafficking in Human Beings: Modern Slavery, 
20 euR. J. int’L L. 453, 455 (2009). 
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reframing of trafficking under international human rights law to capture its 
diversity and maximize its protection. This would not require the rejection 
of the prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor or the prohibition 
of torture and other ill-treatment but would reserve its application to appro-
priate cases130 without excluding others from the protection of international 
human rights law as a result. This would allow for different preventive, 
protective, and reparative strategies to be applied131 and minimize the risk 
that the threshold is raised so much that only a minimal number of cases 
are capable of inclusion. 
Finally, from the perspective of the prohibition of torture and other 
ill-treatment, trafficking is situated within a range of attempts to expand 
the definition to include cases beyond the classical detention situation. As 
already noted, expansion can risk the integrity, meaning, and gravitas of 
the prohibition and therefore, it is not always wise to stretch existing defini-
tions under international human rights law to accommodate new practices 
because of the potential inefficacy and meaninglessness that dilution can 
entail. When analyzing the application of the prohibition to trafficking, 
therefore, the instrumental benefits to trafficking victims cannot constitute 
the only consideration. 
Equally, the construction of the prohibition as set out in this article 
largely constrains radical expansion or reconceptualization. The history and 
negotiations to the Convention against Torture illustrate the prohibition’s 
concern with state involvement in torture and other ill-treatment and until 
broader international human rights law affirmatively departs from this cen-
trality, this is unlikely to change. At the same time, while an imperfect tool 
for addressing all aspects of violence by non-state actors, the prohibition 
of torture and other ill-treatment offers a focused way in which to capture 
and address the state’s fulfillment of its obligations for acts primarily car-
ried out by non-state actors that has not yet been fully clarified, as well as 
deepen understandings of underdeveloped aspects of the definition, such 
as psychological methods of torture and other ill-treatment and the role of 
the state purpose requirement in due diligence cases. This approach would 
fortify rather than undermine the integrity of the prohibition of torture. Certain 
trafficking cases would offer strong test cases to bring clarity to the reach 
of the definition. Its inclusion in a concrete, legal way, rather than under a 
vague advocacy banner, offers significant support to the establishment of the 
parameters of the definition of torture and other ill-treatment.
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